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May 1, 2007 
 
Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Specter, and Members of the Committee: Thank you 
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Patent Reform Act of 2007. I 
testify here on my own behalf, and my views are not necessarily those of any institution 
with which I am associated. 
 
The issue before the Committee unquestionably involves a great deal of intellectual 
property arcana.  
 
Even for many patent attorneys the issue is obscure. In the view of many observers, 
however, the question at issue reduces to an elemental proposition of a just system of 
laws: That like cases should be decided alike, regardless of the forum in which the case is 
heard.1 This issue also potentially implicates the ability of the U.S. patent enforcement 
regime to achieve congressional objectives, the availability of high technology products 
to U.S. consumers, and the compliance of the United States with its international 
obligations. As a result, the current fragmented enforcement regime associated with 
process patents is well worth further consideration by the 110th Congress. 
 
The Enforcement of Process Patents 
 
When a patent claim is expressed as a series of steps, it is known as a method or process 
claim.2 Traditionally the patent law held that a process claim could be directly infringed 
only by the performance of those steps within the United States. Congress has enacted 
two statutes that modify this principle, however. Each of these statutes allow U.S. patent 
holders to prevent foreign manufacturers from practicing their proprietary processes 
abroad; and then importing the product of that process into this country. 
 
The first of these statutes was the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended through subsequent 
legislation. That statute makes it unlawful to import into the United States "articles that . . 
. are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process covered by 
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the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent."4 If the patent proprietor 
successfully seeks an exclusion order from the International Trade Commission (ITC), it 
may obtain a ban on imported products produced through the infringing process. 
 
Alternatively, under the Patent Act of 1952, as amended by the Process Patent 
Amendments Act of 1988 (PPAA),5 a patent holder may bring an action in federal 
district court against the importing manufacturer. The prevailing patentee in those 
circumstances may obtain an injunction against the importer, along with monetary 
damages to compensate for the infringement. As codified at 35 U.S.C. 271(g), a number 
of exceptions limit liability under the PPAA. In particular, 271(g) provides that if the 
product is materially changed by subsequent processes, or becomes a trivial or 
nonessential component of another product, then there is no infringement. 
 
The Kinik Dicta 
 
The 2004 opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Kinik Co. v. 
International Trade Commission has resulted in controversy over the scope of protection 
afforded process patents.7 The Kinik case involved the 3M Corporation's claims that the 
Kinik Company was importing products into the United States from Taiwan that were 
made through use of 3M's patented process. The Federal Circuit resolved the litigation by 
concluding first, that the ITC had not properly construed the claims of the 3M patent, and 
second, that under a proper claim construction, the 3M patent was not infringed. 
 
Although apparently not necessary to resolve the dispute before it, the Federal Circuit 
also embarked upon an excursion in statutory interpretation. In addition to its 
noninfringement argument, Kinik asserted that its product was "materially changed by 
subsequent processes" beyond the alleged use of 3M's patented process. Although this 
defense is acknowledged within the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
exceptions set forth in 35 U.S.C. 271(g)(1) and (2) do not apply to proceedings under the 
Tariff Act. In support of its conclusion, the court of appeals observed that the legislative 
history of the Process Patent Amendments Act provided: 
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There is no intention to impose any of these limitations upon owners of products or on 
owners of process patents in suits they are able to bring under existing law. Neither is 
there any invention for these provisions to limit in any way the ability of process patent 
owners to obtain relief from the U.S. International Trade Commission.9 
 
The court of appeals further stated that it would apply Chevron deference in support of 
the ITC's conclusion that the exceptions identified in 271(g) do not apply to exclusion 
actions. 
 
The Kinik dicta has attracted criticism. With respect to the language from the legislative 
history, one commentator has explained that "the most natural reading" of this language 
is simply an intention not to constrain the ability of patent holders to obtain exclusion 
orders from the ITC, even though similar relief was now available in the federal district 
courts.11 Similarly, the notion that "these limitations [do not apply to] owners of 
products or . . . owners of process patents in suits they are able to bring under existing 
law" suggests that the two exceptions do not apply to charges of process patent 
infringement in other, wholly domestic situations. 
 
The application of Chevron deference has also been critiqued. According to one 
commentator, "after the Process Patent Amendments Act was passed in 1988, the ITC 
consistently and openly recognized the general applicability of 271(g) defenses in 
exclusion actions." The ITC's apparently changing views suggest that deference may not 
be appropriate, particularly because 
 
"the ITC is not the agency charged with interpreting the Patent Act." 
 
Consequences of the Kinik Dicta 
 
Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit correctly construed the governing statutes in 
Kinik or not, recent scholarly commentary has urged Congress to address the fragmented 
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enforcement regime that now exists for process patents in the United States.14 This 
commentary has identified numerous complications that arise from varying enforcement 
possibilities between the ITC and the federal district courts. 
 
First, Congress intended the two exceptions of the Process Patents Amendment Act to 
balance the traditional competing objectives that inform intellectual property policy: 
Encouraging the labors that result in innovation, on one hand, and disseminating the 
fruits of the labors to the public, on the other. The "materially changed" and "nonessential 
component" limitations both balance the interests of patent proprietors with follow-on 
innovators and also recognize the territorial nature of the patent instrument. These 
congressional intentions may not be achieved if the patent proprietor can readily select a 
forum where the two limitations upon 271(g) simply do not apply.15 
 
Second, our current fragmented enforcement policy may limit the access of U.S. 
consumers to innovative products. As one commentator explains, "[o]ne could argue that 
Kinik chafes against the interests of U.S. consumers, consumers who would benefit from 
having access to less expensive goods, including everything from medicines to 
automobile parts." 
 
Finally, the remedial disparity between the district courts and the ITC potentially favors 
domestic industry over foreign firms. Because the availability of an exclusion order is 
premised upon the existence of a domestic industry, "[t]here is a clear difference in the 
defenses available for foreign goods and importers thereof when compared to their 
domestic counterparts, potentially constituting a 'disguised restriction on trade."' Another 
commentator observes: 
 
Kinik also has implications for international relations. Since Kinik stands for the idea that 
the ITC can lawfully make it significantly harder for a defendant to establish a defense 
based on noninfringement in an exclusion dispute, the foreign business community is 
likely to view this as an instance of protectionism. After all, the ITC is a body that can 
unilaterally exclude foreign products from importation into the United States, a fact that 
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will inevitably color foreign perception of the fairness of its procedures. More 
specifically, foreign business interests are likely to find unfair (and perhaps hypocritical) 
Kinik's refusal to extend 271(g)'s defenses-defenses that all defendants have in U.S. 
federal courts-to exclusion actions given the aggregate effect of exclusion orders on the 
balance of trade in intellectual property. Foreign businesses are likely to find this policy 
unfair (and perhaps hypocritical) . 
 
Although the analysis of whether the current situation constitutes a violation of the 
TRIPS Agreement is complex, the perceived favoritism for U.S. industry over foreign 
firms may send a conflicting message as the United States proceeds against Israel, China, 
and other trading partners for perceived lapses in their intellectual property regimes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since at least the publication of Artistotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the notion that like 
cases should be treated alike has been viewed as central to the notion of justice. The 
disparate results available to process patent holders in the ITC, as compared to the district 
courts, has been broadly viewed as violating this fundamental norm of equivalence. 
Because these dissimilar rules of law potentially conflict with congressional intent, limit 
competition, and portray the United States in a negative light, academic commentary has 
expressed "hope that Congress will soon step in to ensure that the fragmented 
enforcement regime Kinik endorses is dismantled sooner rather than later." I look 
forward to hearing the view of my fellow witnesses on today's panel, and to answering 
any questions that may be presented. Thank you. 
